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1. Introduction 
Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy presupposes the normal functioning of our faculties in 
everyday life, whether concerning knowledge, morality, or pleasure and displeasure. (I 
explain why I use the term “normal” shortly). According to Kant, “critique” means an 
examination of “all the claims that these powers [our cognitive faculties] make, in order to 
place these powers within the boundaries of their rightful [use]” (Kant, 1987: 15). These 
claims include illegitimate claims that lead us into predicaments such as what Kant calls 
antinomies. It is part of our faculties’ normal operation in everyday life that they make such 
illegitimate claims. Kant’s critique thus tries to set the division between our faculties’ 
legitimate and illegitimate use in their normal functioning. If Kant’s critique assumed that 
there are different ways in which our faculties operate, it would examine whether we can 
distinguish between their legitimate and illegitimate use in each of these different ways. If 
we can, it would make the distinction in each of these different ways. Kant’s critical 
philosophy leaves aside the possibility that our faculties may operate differently. His 
anthropological writing, however, addresses this possibility.  
The present chapter aims to spell out Kant’s idea in his anthropological writing that our 
faculties can operate differently than in their normal way, we can thereby experience 
differently, and the range of what we can make of ourselves can be expanded. I said 
“normal.” On the one hand, Kant employs the language of mental illness when describing 
an experience where our faculties operate differently than in the normal way. Here the term 
normal means not suffering from mental disorder. On the other hand, Kant thinks that we 
should appreciate both a different exercise of our faculties than in their normal fashion and 
a different mode of experience thereby generated. Here the term normal means standard or 
ordinary in everyday life. I use the term normal because these two meanings of it capture 
these two manners in which Kant characterizes a different operation of our faculties. 
To explain Kant’s idea a little further, the world is extremely rich and constantly changing in 
its every aspect. A large part of such richness and change usually escapes our awareness so 
that our faculties operate in their normal way without being sensorially overloaded. At 
certain moments, however, the world affects us so that our sense faculties are overloaded 
and forced to function differently. At such moments our senses become unusually 
heightened. Sensations and perceptions different from normal ones are generated. Our 
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faculties become more vitalized than when they are functioning in the normal way. Aspects 
of the world hidden from us when our faculties are operating in their normal fashion are 
revealed. We experience in a new, richer way. The mode of experience is thereby favorably 
modified. 
This idea of Kant is one strand of his reflections on what the human being can make of 
himself/herself, and such reflections constitute part of anthropology for Kant. Posing the 
question of “what is a human being?,” i.e. the problem concerning the essence of human 
nature, Kant states that this is the question to be answered in “anthropology” (Kant, 1988: 
28-9; 1999: 458). In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant finds the essence of 
human nature in the fact that the human being is a self-creating being. Anthropology for 
Kant explores the essence of human nature in this sense. That is, Kant’s anthropology is a 
discipline that inquires into what the human being “makes of himself [/herself], or can and 
should make of himself [/herself]” (Kant, 2006: 3). If today a discipline that investigates the 
essence of human nature is regarded as philosophical anthropology, Kant’s anthropology 
counts as philosophical anthropology.1 The present chapter then addresses a topic in 
philosophical anthropology (i.e. that of what we can make of ourselves) using the method of 
philosophical argument based on a reading of a philosophical text (i.e. Kant’s text). My 
study has two key results. First, an under-researched dimension of Kant’s thought is 
revealed because his idea just noted has been unexamined.2 Second, it is shown that Kant’s 
idea finds support in contemporary empirical research. The moral to be drawn from Kant’s 
idea for our self-understanding is that we are capable of more, the range of what we can 
make of ourselves is wider, and there is more to sense, perceive, and think in the world, 
than the normal functioning of our faculties leads us to believe.  
2. Explication 
We explicate two passages from Kant’s work in which he expresses his idea noted above. 
First, we introduce these two passages and mention our faculties whose normal functioning 
Kant says is suspended. Second, we examine Kant’s remarks on astonishment, dreaming, 
and imagination. Third, we consider Kant’s view on artistic activity. This is because Kant 
suggests that artistic activity is an example in which our faculties operate differently and 
that our experience of artistic activity illustrates what the experience described in the two 
passages would be like. Fourth, we look at Kant’s descriptions of how exactly our faculties 
function differently. Fifth, we spend a few words on Kant’s usage of the terms 
supersensible, abyss, and wisdom in one of the two passages. Lastly, we conclude by 
suggesting the implications of my argument for Kant scholarship as well as for research in 
anthropology. 
2.1 Two passages 
The first of the two passages to be explicated occurs in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
                                                 
1 See Van de Pitte (1971), as well as three recent books on Kant’s anthropology indexed under the 
heading of philosophical anthropology: Jacobs & Kain (2003), Louden (2011), and Wilson (2007). 
2 It is unexamined in the works mentioned in note 1 above, Cohen (2008), and two books on Kant that 
can be said to represent recent Kant scholarship: Guyer (1992, 2006). 
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The present world discloses to us such an immeasurable showplace of manifoldness, order, 
purposiveness, and beauty, whether one pursues these in the infinity of space or in the 
unlimited division of it, that in accordance with even the knowledge about it that our weak 
understanding can acquire, all speech [Sprache] concerning so many and such unfathomable 
wonders must lose its power to express, all numbers their power to measure, and even our 
thoughts lack boundaries [alle Begrenzung], so that our judgment upon the whole must 
resolve itself into a speechless [sprachloses], but nonetheless eloquent, astonishment 
[beredteres Erstaunen]. (Kant, 1998: A622/B650)3 
In experiencing this we feel as if we are in a “dream [Traum]” while awake (A624/B652). 
The second passage appears in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: 
Surprise [Verwunderung] (confusion [Verlegenheit] at finding oneself in an unexpected 
situation) at first impedes the natural play of thought and is therefore unpleasant; but later it 
promotes the influx of thought to the unexpected representation all the more and thus 
becomes an agreeable excitement of feeling. However, this affect is properly called 
astonishment [Erstaunen] only if we are thereby quite uncertain whether the perception takes 
place when we are awake or dreaming [träumend]. A newcomer in the world [Ein Neuling in 
der Welt] is surprised at everything, but he who has become acquainted with the course of 
things through varied experience makes it a principle to be surprised at nothing. On the 
other hand, he who thoughtfully and with a scrutinizing eye pursues the order of nature in 
its great variety falls into astonishment [Erstaunen] at wisdom that he did not expect:… 
However, such an affect is stimulated only by reason, and is a kind of sacred awe at seeing 
the abyss [Abgrund] of the supersensible [Übersinnlichen] opening before one’s feet (Kant, 
2006: 160; emphasis in original). 
In what follows, when I refer separately to these two passages I say the first passage and the 
second passage, when I refer to them together I say the two passages, and when I refer to 
the experience described in the two passages I say the experience at issue. 
We read the first passage in terms of Kant’s anthropology. The first passage appears when 
Kant critiques a physico-theological proof for the existence of a necessary being in his 
discussion of transcendental theology (Kant, 1998: A620-30/B648-58). Kant’s critique, 
however, “does not belong to transcendental theology because of its strong empirical 
premise” (Allison, 2004: 509, n. 34). It properly belongs to anthropology. It should occur in 
Kant’s anthropological writing rather than in the first Critique. It is no surprise that the 
notion conveyed in the first passage is also expressed in the second passage from the 
Anthropology. The “strong empirical premise” just noted consists of two ideas. One is that we 
go through the experience at issue. The other is that those who have undergone the 
experience at issue are psychologically compelled to assume and believe in the existence of a 
necessary being (A622-4/B650-2). If the premise in question were part of transcendental 
theology, it would entail that people necessarily go through the former experience and that 
the former experience is necessarily followed by the latter experience. That the premise is a 
“strong empirical” one means that people do not necessarily go through the former 
experience and that the former experience is not necessarily followed by the latter 
experience. People can undergo the former without going through the latter. The present 
                                                 
3 References to Kant (1998) are given with the standard A and B paginations. 
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chapter treats only the former experience (i.e. the experience at issue). To interpret the first 
passage in this manner requires us to decontextualize it somewhat from the first Critique. 
Such a reading can be justified because the content of the first passage properly belongs to 
anthropology. 
We interpret the two passages in light of the preface to the Anthropology. Kant’s 
anthropology, as noted, considers the human being a self-creating being and investigates 
what he/she “makes of himself [/herself], or can and should make of himself [/herself]” 
(Kant, 2006: 3). One way to explore and expand the potential of what we can make of 
ourselves is to coordinate one faculty with another in an unusual way. For instance, 
“perceptions” can “hinder,” “stimulate,” “enlarge,” and make “agile” “the faculty of 
memory” (3). Presumably, here the faculty of memory, while hindered from operating in its 
normal way, is unusually heightened (stimulated, enlarged, made agile, etc.). The idea that 
perceptions activate the faculty of memory in an extraordinary way in exploring and 
expanding the potential of what we can make of ourselves reminds us of Marcel Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time. The preface to the Anthropology indicates that if our faculties operate 
differently as described in the two passages we would experience differently and thereby 
the range of what we can make of ourselves may be expanded. 
Referring to a “newcomer in the world [Ein Neuling in der Welt]” in the second passage, Kant 
indicates his view on how the normal functioning of our faculties emerges. A “newcomer in 
the world” is a person who is new and has little experience in the world (not in a specific 
activity or situation). Presumably, by “newcomer in the world” Kant means an infant or a 
person whose mode of experience resembles that of an infant. Initially, the world impinges 
on a “newcomer in the world” so that he/she is “surprised at everything” because 
everything he/she encounters is unexpected and unfamiliar to him/her. Somehow, his/her 
faculties gradually begin to operate in a fixed, stable way while his/her mode of experience 
gradually becomes fixed and stable. Eventually, such a fixed, stable functioning of his/her 
faculties somehow becomes their normal operation, which establishes his/her normal mode 
of experience. He/she now “has become acquainted with the course of things through 
varied experience.” The unexpected and unfamiliar turns into the expected and familiar. 
While losing a sense of surprise, he/she gains a sense of order and security concerning the 
world and his/her relation to it. 
The normal functioning of our faculties thus established becomes suspended in the 
experience at issue. Since what is in question here is an experience of the world, our faculties 
involved in experience, such as the faculty of the senses, all temporarily lose their normal 
power. That all speech or language loses its power to express means that the normal power 
of signifying thought is lost. Speech or language in the first passage is meant to refer to “the 
faculty of using signs” in its highest function (Kant, 2006: 84). Kant argues that for the 
human being “thinking is speaking with oneself… inwardly” and “language” is the “best 
way of signifying thought” (86; emphasis in original). That is why Kant says in the first 
passage that “our thoughts,” including the categories, empirical concepts, moral concepts, 
and Ideas of reason, lose all their boundaries or definiteness (alle Begrenzung). A sense of 
purposiveness and beauty, which concerns what would soon be called the judgment of 
taste, is lost. Concepts losing their power to signify include the categories of causality 
(“effects and causes”) and quantity (“all numbers”) as well as concepts of “ends and means” 
(Kant, 1998: A622/650). Thus the understanding, whose concepts these categories are, 
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temporarily loses its normal power. So does reason because with “ends and means” Kant 
refers to reason. Kant defines philosophy as the “science of the relation of all cognition to the 
essential ends of human reason” (A839/B867). “Essential ends… are either the final end, or 
subalternate ends, which necessarily belong to the former as means (A840/B868).” 
Moreover, “the former [the final end] is nothing other than the entire vocation of human 
beings, and the philosophy of it is called moral philosophy” (A840/B868). The concept of 
the “final end” too loses its conceptual power. This means that our moral capacity along 
with moral concepts is also suspended.  
While ceasing to function in the normal way, our faculties operate differently. This 
transition is stressed in the two passages through contrasts between “natural” and 
“unexpected,” between “unpleasant” and “agreeable,” between an experienced person and 
a “newcomer in the world,” between “surprised at nothing” and “astonishment,” between 
“awake” and “dreaming,” and between “speechless” and “eloquent.” With these contrasts 
in mind, we turn to an explication of the two passages. 
2.2 Astonishment, dream, imagination 
Astonishment in the first passage is said to be a “speechless” but “eloquent” one. We can 
consider these two apparently incompatible characterizations compatible. Astonishment is 
“speechless” in terms of our faculties’ normal functioning because they temporarily lose 
their normal power including that of all speech. Astonishment is “eloquent” in terms of the 
possibility that our faculties operate differently. There are many ways in which they 
function differently and we thereby experience differently. Astonishment is felt and 
expressed in a manner corresponding with each of these ways. Astonishment is “eloquent” 
in terms of these different manners in which it is felt and expressed. 
Astonishment is characterized also by seemingly incompatible elements about reflection. As 
the second passage shows, for Kant surprise is an affect. So is astonishment, which is a type 
of surprise. Kant defines “affect” as the “feeling of a pleasure or displeasure in the subject’s 
present state that does not let him rise to reflection [Überlegung] (Kant, 2006: 149; emphasis in 
original). “[A]ffect… makes reflection [Überlegung] impossible” (150). But Kant also says that 
“surprise [Verwunderung]… already contains reflection [Überlegung] in itself” (153, translation 
modified; emphasis in original). Astonishment “makes reflection impossible” and “contains 
reflection in itself.” These two apparently inconsistent characterizations can be likewise 
rendered consistent. Astonishment makes the normal functioning of reflection impossible 
(involving an “unpleasant” feeling) and contains a different exercise of reflection (involving 
an “agreeable excitement of feeling”). We will examine Kant’s discussion of the faculty of 
reflection later. 
Kant’s stance towards the affect of astonishment reveals two ways in which he characterizes 
an experience of a different exercise of our faculties. On the one hand, Kant’s stance in the 
two passages that astonishment is an “eloquent,” “agreeable excitement of feeling” indicates 
his view that we should appreciate such an experience. On the other hand, Kant’s attitude is 
like the one toward a sick mind. Kant states that a person seized by an affect should 
“probably always” be regarded as suffering an “illness of the mind [Krankheit des Gemüths]” 
(Kant, 2006: 149; emphasis in original). Such a person “resembles a deranged person” (151). 
“Affects are generally diseased occurrences [Krankhaften Zufälle] (symptoms)” (154). When 
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our faculties operate differently, we would feel in terms of their normal functioning as if we 
are afflicted by a mental illness. Kant, however, thinks that we may not necessarily feel in 
this way because the words “probably always,” “resembles,” and “generally” imply, 
respectively, not always, not exactly the same, and different in rare cases. We could instead 
appreciate a different exercise of our faculties. 
Astonishment is an affect by which we are seized when the activity of the mind is modified. 
In the second passage Kant states that “such an affect [astonishment] is stimulated only by 
reason.” By reason Kant does not mean the faculty that concerns ends and means, Ideas, and 
morality. Otherwise Kant would contradict his view that our normal thoughts including 
Ideas of reason and moral concepts lose their power. We would have to attribute to Kant the 
idea that this faculty induces a state close to that of mental illness. We would have to think 
that this faculty stimulates the process in which perception becomes abnormal, because “this 
affect [surprise] is properly called astonishment only if we are thereby quite uncertain 
whether the perception takes place when we are awake or dreaming.” As we will see 
shortly, Kant’s characterization of dreaming leaves no room for the role of reason in this 
sense. That astonishment “already contains reflection in itself” indicates that it has to do 
with the activity of the mind as a whole because, as we will see, reflection involves the 
activity of the mind as a whole. We should think that by reason here Kant means the activity 
of the mind as a whole. We should think that in saying “only by reason” Kant stresses that, 
while the world impinges upon us so that it forces our faculties (mind) to function 
differently, astonishment is an affect stimulated by the mind differently operating rather 
than directly by the world impinging upon us. 
Kant thinks that something akin to what is happening in dreaming is occurring when our 
faculties operate differently so that we feel like we are dreaming while awake. Kant 
expresses this when he states, as just cited, that “this affect is properly called astonishment 
only if we are quite uncertain whether the perception takes place when we are awake or 
dreaming.” To understand what is implied by Kant’s reference to dreaming, we look at how 
he characterizes the phenomenon of dreaming. Its three characteristics capture Kant’s 
attention: involuntariness, the power of imagination, and the vitalizing of the mind’s forces. 
Kant defines “dreaming” as “an involuntary play of one’s images in sleep” or the “play of 
fantasy with the human being in sleep” (Kant, 2006: 60, 68; emphasis in original). “The 
power of imagination, in so far as it also produces images involuntarily, is called fantasy” 
(60; emphasis in original). Dreaming occurs involuntarily. We cannot dream at will. 
Similarly, in the experience at issue our faculties involuntarily operate differently. We 
cannot induce this at will. Presumably, in certain moments we are involuntarily affected by 
the world such that our faculties are forced to function differently. Kant suggests this when 
he says in the first passage “the present world discloses to us…” At certain moments the 
world somehow discloses itself to us in an overwhelming way. The faculty of imagination 
has its productive and reproductive functions. It is “productive… as a faculty of intuition 
without the presence of the object… that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the 
object… which thus precedes experience.” It is “reproductive” when it “brings back to the 
mind an empirical intuition that it had previously” (60; emphasis in original). As we will 
see, Kant argues that the power of imagination in its productive function plays a crucial role 
when our faculties operate differently. Dreaming animates the “powers of the soul more 
than when everything goes smoothly” (Kant, 2006: 83; also 69). The phrase “when 
everything goes smoothly” is meant to characterize the time when our faculties operate in 
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their normal fashion in the waking state where the course of things is expected and familiar. 
Our faculties are more vitalized when operating differently as portrayed in the two passages 
than when functioning in the normal way. 
The issue of mental disorder enters here again. Discussing what it is like “if it [what is 
occurring in dreaming] happens while the human being is awake,” Kant states: “it reveals a 
diseased condition [Krankhaften Zustand]” (Kant, 2006: 68). Note that this statement amounts 
to describing what the experience at issue would be like. This statement is also in agreement 
with Kant’s view noted earlier that cases in which our faculties operate differently are 
“diseased occurrences [Krankhaften Zufälle].” An activity of our faculties is seen as revealing 
a “diseased condition” if it differs from their normal activity so that we feel something going 
wrong, like suffering from mental disorder. We may not feel in that way, however. If we do 
not, such an activity would be described and appreciated simply as an activity different 
from the normal one. That is why Kant considers the experience at issue both to be 
appreciated and to be characterized in the language of mental illness.  
Kant thinks that the activity of our faculties has its neural basis in the brain. Treating the 
same three characteristics of the phenomenon of dreaming, Kant states that imagination’s 
activity is based on a “nervous energy that proceeds from the brain, the seat of 
representations” (Kant, 1996: 320). Kant also says that to explain the “power of imagination” 
we need knowledge of “the brain” and of the regions in it where representations enter into 
relationships with one another (Kant, 2006: 69). By the term representation (Vorstellung) 
Kant means all kinds of mental content generated by our faculties. Under the “genus” of 
“the representation in general” there is the “representation with consciousness” (Kant, 1998: 
A320/B376). This refers to all kinds of mental content we are aware of: sensations, 
perception of the external world, memories, concepts, thoughts, Ideas of reason, whatever is 
produced by the power of imagination, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (Kant, 
1987: 47-8; 1998: A320/B376-7; 2006: 45, 54-9, 75, 90, 126, 128). There are also representations 
we are unconscious of (Kant, 2006: 23-6). Kant’s reference to a “nervous energy that 
proceeds from the brain, the seat of representations” indicates his idea that we need to 
examine the brain and neural circuits in it to know how our faculties function. 
2.3 Artistic activity 
Kant suggests that artistic activity is an example of a different exercise of our faculties and 
that our experience of artistic activity exemplifies the experience at issue. Artistic activity 
covers what is happening in both creating and appreciating artworks. As Kant’s remarks 
examined below indicate, his view on art and artistic activity is similar to the “formula” 
proposed by Eldridge: “the formula that works of art present a subject matter as a focus for 
thought and emotional attitude, distinctively fused to the imaginative exploration of 
material” (Eldridge, 2003: 259). We do not go into a definition of art, however. Nor do we 
examine in what respect Kant’s idea on art may or may not require revision in light of art 
after Kant. We deal with Kant’s view on artistic activity insofar as it helps explicate the two 
passages. Our discussion helps illuminate Kant’s descriptions of how exactly our faculties 
operate differently, as we will see in the next section. 
In his Anthropology Kant suggests that in artistic activity our faculties function differently 
than in the normal way. Kant says that there are moments when we encounter “the startling 
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[das Auffallende], something that… arouses the mind [Gemüth] to collect itself for reflection 
[sich zur Überlegung zu sammeln]” (Kant, 2006: 153; emphasis in original). This remark is 
followed by Kant’s statement, a part of which we have looked at: “it [the startling] is the 
stimulus to surprise [Verwunderung] (which already contains reflection [Überlegung] in 
itself).” Kant goes on: “This does not happen so easily to the experienced person; but it is 
proper for art [Kunst] to present the usual [das Gewöhnliche] from a point of view that will 
make it startling.” When we adults live everyday life, we are each an “experienced person” 
who tends to find the “usual” everywhere. There are, however, moments when we find 
ourselves engaged in an activity that makes the “usual” present itself as the “startling,” i.e. 
artistic activity. In these remarks Kant speaks of the mind as a whole (Gemüth), not of this or 
that individual cognitive faculty. As we will see, reflection involves the activity of the mind 
as a whole. That the mind is aroused to “collect itself for reflection” indicates that its or 
reflection’s activity is suspended. Otherwise it would not need to “collect itself for 
reflection.” Presumably, what is suspended when we encounter the “startling” with a sense 
of “surprise” is the normal activity of the mind or reflection, i.e. its activity when it operates 
with the “usual.” This corresponds to Kant’s notion that surprise or astonishment makes 
reflection impossible. At the same time, a different exercise of the mind or reflection is 
promoted when the “usual” turns into the “startling,” as shown by Kant’s statement that 
“surprise… already contains reflection in itself.” Collecting itself for reflection in this 
manner, the mind is vitalized to modify its activity. Surprise arises through such a 
modification. This is how artistic activity affects us by making the “usual” manifest itself as 
the “startling.” 
These remarks can be seen as illustrating the experience at issue. Not this or that individual 
faculty but the mind as a whole loses its normal power. Our normal speech is suspended. 
While Kant does not discuss artistic activity in the two passages, to be faced with a great 
artwork is surely one of the experiences where our “speech is inhibited” (Sallis, 2008: 2). As 
we have seen drawing on Kant’s reference to dreaming, the activity of the mind as a whole 
is animated toward a different exercise of our faculties. As we will see in the next section, 
reflection, while hindered from functioning in the normal way, operates differently. Kant’s 
remark that “this does not happen so easily to the experienced person” has a counterpart in 
the second passage: surprise or astonishment does not arise in a person “who has become 
acquainted with the course of things through varied experience.” As the “usual” manifests 
itself as the “startling” through artistic activity, an “experienced person” experiences 
differently with a sense of surprise. Similarly, the world that we have become acquainted 
with presents itself differently in the experience at issue, so that, while the “natural” flow of 
representations is impeded, an influx of “unexpected” representations is promoted. We 
experience like a “newcomer in the world,” “surprised at everything.”4 We thereby 
experience differently. Astonishment as a type of surprise arises through a modification of 
the activity of the mind. I suggest that, given these parallels, Kant’s remarks on artistic 
activity discussed above can be said to illustrate the experience at issue. 
                                                 
4 This is precisely what the artists Shusaku Arakawa and Madeline Gins intended when they 
constructed “Ubiquitous Site Nagi Ryoanji Architectural Body” and “Reversible Destiny” series. See 
their works at http://www.reversibledestiny.org. Arakawa states that the site is designed such that, 
once we enter it, it makes us physically “unbalanced” and makes us feel like a “baby” whose body lacks 
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In the Critique of Judgment Kant treats artistic activity in relation to fine art, genius, and what 
he calls “aesthetic ideas,” referring to painting, sculpture, and poetry (Kant, 1987: 181-6). In 
artistic activity a representation of the imagination “prompts much thought… so that no 
language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it” (182). “The imagination ([in its 
role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another 
nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. We use it to entertain ourselves when 
experience strikes us as overly routine. We may even restructure experience” (182). “In this 
process we feel freedom from the law of association” so that the imagination is prompted to 
“spread over a multitude of kindred representations” (182, 183). Thereby we “animate” or 
“quicken” the “soul” or “mind”, strengthening the “mental powers” (182, 183). All this 
concerns the normal functioning of our faculties because Kant then states that in artistic 
activity “we also follow principles which reside higher up [than imagination], namely, in 
reason” (182). The imagination operates in such a way that respect for reason’s power, 
especially in terms of morality, is inspired. Also, the imagination and understanding are in 
free, harmonious play (182-6). 
Certainly, analogous things are taking place in the experience at issue. The power of 
imagination plays a key role (which we discuss in the next section). Our standard language 
loses its expressive power. The mind is animated. The world presents itself differently, just 
as “actual nature” manifests itself as “another nature.” The experience of artistic activity 
described in the Critique of Judgment resembles the experience at issue to that extent. The 
difference, however, is that in the experience at issue all these things, since they concern a 
different exercise of our faculties, occur in a way uncontainable in artistic activity treated in 
the third Critique. For instance, in the experience at issue our faculties operate differently 
without heeding, let alone following, principles residing in reason. Instead of our feeling 
“freedom from the law of association,” we are affected by the imagination’s involuntarily 
accelerated associative activity processing different kinds and amounts of information in 
different manners at different tempos, consciously and unconsciously. Instead of a 
“multitude of kindred representations,” that of “unexpected” representations is generated. 
Kant says nothing about whether the imagination and understanding are in harmonious 
play. We will see all this in the next section. When he suggests the similarity between artistic 
activity and a different exercise of our faculties described in the two passages, Kant thinks of 
artistic activity close to that discussed in the Anthropology. 
We can read Kant’s view on artistic activity in the third Critique in terms of that in the 
Anthropology. If we do so, Kant’s suggestion that artistic activity is one example in which our 
faculties operate differently helps illuminate what the experience at issue would be like. 
Some scholars read Kant in this way. Pillow shows that Kant’s argument on aesthetic ideas 
can be understood as implying that through the “disclosive power of imagination” 
“aesthetic experience has the potential to challenge “natural” seeming habits of thought, to 
destablize taken-for-granted patters of judgment,” and to “cut new paths of sense” or 
“significance” in which we make sense of life and the world (Pillow, 2000: 5-6). By “aesthetic 
experience” Pillow means “the artistically creative dimension of our interpretive responses 
to each other and our worlds” (Pillow, 2000: 9). This is a dimension of experiencing life and 
the world. Pillow’s view is closer to Kant’s in the Anthropology than that in the third Critique. 
For example, the “usual” would display itself as the “startling” as our ““natural” seeming 
habits of thought” are “challenge[d],” “taken-for-granted patterns of judgment” are 
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“destabilize[d],” and, in Kant’s words in the second passage, the “natural play of thought” 
is “impede[d].” To “cut new paths of sense” or “significance” instead would require the 
mind to “collect itself for reflection.” 
Hughes reads Kant’s discussion on artistic activity in the Critique of Judgment as implying 
that “artworks make us see differently” and “expand” our “perception of nature” (Hughes, 
2010: 172). This amounts to interpreting Kant’s idea in the third Critique in terms of that in 
the Anthropology. If “it is proper for art to present the usual from a point of view that will 
make it startling,” we surely see differently through artistic activity. Kant states that there 
are moments when “nature… displays itself as art” (Kant, 1987: 168). This would be one 
example in which “actual nature” presents itself as “another nature” through artistic 
activity. We can consider this statement in terms of Kant’s view on artistic activity in the 
Anthropology. That nature manifests itself as art would then mean that nature ceases to 
appear in its “usual” form and presents itself as something “startling.” We can say that 
nature manifests itself as art in this sense when we experience the world in the way 
described in the two passages. 
Drawing on Kant’s remarks about fine art and nature as art in the Critique of Judgment, and 
taking Cézanne’s painting as an example, Hughes further argues that “it is as though nature 
has become Cézanne’s painting” so that we can perceive nature differently through that 
painting (Hughes, 2010: 172). The way Cézanne perceives nature (or the way he is forced by 
nature to perceive it) differs greatly from the way we normally perceive it. If we perceive it 
in the way Cézanne does, we would “see differently” and “expand” our “perception of 
nature.”5 Kant’s reference noted earlier to the neural basis in the brain for the functioning of 
our faculties suggests that, when our perception is thus modified, the existing neural circuits 
in the brain would also be modified. Once this has happened, the mode of experience would 
no longer be the same as before and would be modified. We would “restructure 
experience.”6 All this finds empirical support in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, taking 
examples of artworks including those of Cézanne, Zeki shows that, as we experience 
artworks, neural circuits in the brain and our mode of experience are modified (Zeki, 2000). 
At any rate, Kant suggests that artistic activity illuminates what a different exercise of our 
faculties as described in the two passages would be like. We will discuss the so-called 
Stendhal syndrome and see the similarity between our experience of artistic activity and the 
experience at issue. 
                                                 
5 In this connection, Kant’s reference to a “newcomer in the world” reminds us of Cézanne’s aspiration 
“to see like a newborn child!”, to see the world as an endlessly new wonder. See Doran (2001: 23; also 
48). 
6 Kant’s view on artistic activity bears similarities to Robert Henri’s view on art and life. Henri says: 
“The world and life are common, every day,” but “[t]here are moments in our lives, there are moments 
in a day, when we seem to see beyond the usual” (Henri, 2007: 42, 182). Henri goes on: “We reach then 
into reality. … It is in the nature of all people to have these experiences” (42). Such are the moments of 
art, and such are the artistic experiences. “Art… is the province of every human being,” “in every 
human being there is the artist,” and “art… is in everything” (11, 132, 224). Art and life are inseparable. 
The artist in us finds “wonders” in “the world and life,” and we are filled with “surprise” and “marvel” 
(42, 183). The artist in us “disturbs, upsets, enlightens, and he [/she] opens ways for a better 
understanding” (11), i.e. ways for a modified mode and significance of experience. We are “inventors all 
through life” in that sense (135). 
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2.4 Different operation 
In the two passages Kant does not illustrate how exactly our faculties operate differently 
than in the normal way. Nor does Kant systematically elaborate on this issue elsewhere. 
Still, in several places Kant describes how exactly our faculties function differently. With 
Kant’s view on artistic activity in mind, we look at these descriptions. It is shown that many 
of them capture what Kant considers in the two passages.  
We begin with the faculty of the senses. As noted, Kant thinks that the power of imagination 
is extremely active when our faculties operate differently. The power of imagination works 
with sensations generated by the five senses, but it cannot produce them. “Sensations 
produced by the five senses… cannot be made by means of the power of imagination, but 
must be drawn originally from the faculty of sense” (Kant, 2006: 61). If the five senses 
generate sensations different from normal ones, the power of imagination functions with 
these different sensations. When it does, it would operate differently than in its normal 
fashion. Its different activity would affect us differently than when it works with normal 
sensations. 
Kant discusses what he calls “dizziness” as an example in which we experience sensations 
different from normal ones. “Dizziness [Schwindel]” means a “fast spinning circle of many 
different sensations that is beyond comprehension [or exceeding mental capacity: 
Fassungskraft übersteigenden]”(Kant, 2006: 59; emphasis in original). Though untranslated, the 
word Wechsel (change) is included in this sentence.7 Kant is not speaking of usual cases of 
dizziness such as that we may feel when looking down from a great height.8 Kant is trying 
to describe what we feel when we feel many different sensations constantly changing at 
high speed, or rather, constantly coming one after another at high speed. Each sensation has 
its own degree of “intensive magnitude” (Kant, 1998: A165-9/B207-11). Sensations “differ 
according to degree” (Kant, 2006: 57; emphasis in original). If the change of a sensation 
means that it has a different degree of intensive magnitude, this amounts to saying that a 
different sensation emerges rather than one and the same sensation changes. 
In normal cases we feel sensations distinct from one another (Kant, 1998: A168/B211). In the 
case of dizziness at issue we would feel one sensation (“a” circle and “a” change) as if many 
different sensations were fused with one another in a constantly and rapidly changing way. 
This sensation would be dissimilar to that coming from any one of the five senses. We 
would feel one intensive magnitude corresponding to this sensation rather than intensive 
magnitudes of many different sensations separately. Dissimilar to the intensive magnitude 
of a sensation arising from any one of the five senses, this intensive magnitude would be 
one in which intensive magnitudes of many different sensations are fused with one another 
in a constantly and rapidly changing manner. This sensation could be abnormal and this 
intensive magnitude could be enormous to the point of exceeding our capacity to endure 
(Fassungskraft übersteigenden). 
Kant seems to think of the so-called Stendhal syndrome both in his discussion of the 
experience of dizziness and in the two passages. The Stendhal syndrome refers to cases in 
                                                 
7 Dowell’s translation is “a quickly revolving change of many dissimilar sensations,” where the word 
“circle [Kreise]” is missing (Kant, 1978: 55). 
8 Kant discusses normal cases of dizziness later (Kant, 2006: 62, 71, 163). 
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which, exposed to and overwhelmed by great artworks, people become sensorially 
overloaded, affectively charged, dizzy, and hallucinated, and sometimes fall unconscious.9 
Indeed, Shaviro argues that Kant’s view on aesthetic experience helps illuminate the “so-
called Stendhal syndrome, in which the encounter with a beautiful work of art leads to 
swooning and hallucinations (cf. Dario Argento’s film The Stendhal Syndrome, 1996)” 
(Shaviro, 2009: 7). We can think of aesthetic experience where “nature displays itself as art.” 
Such an experience would resemble that of a great artwork. As noted, the experience at issue 
can be seen as an example in which we perceive nature as if “nature displays itself as art.” 
Those who encounter nature in this way would experience something like the Stendhal 
syndrome. Presumably, what is happening in the experience of dizziness and in the 
experience at issue is this. Nature is extremely rich and constantly changing in its every 
aspect (light, color, sound, smell, texture, etc.). While received by the senses, a large part of 
such richness and change normally escapes our awareness so that our sense faculties 
operate without becoming overloaded. (As we will see, Kant’s remarks on the association of 
representations reveals his notion that the senses are processing far more information than 
we are aware.) As Kant says elsewhere, however, “one and the same representation affects 
the sensation in quite different degrees according to the different mental state of human 
beings” (Kant, 2007: 72). Our senses can be unusually heightened so that what otherwise 
normally escapes our awareness surfaces to consciousness. Depending on our mental state, 
we may become aware of those changes in aspects of the world that have hitherto been 
hidden from our awareness. Sensations generated thereof may be brought to consciousness 
so that we feel sensorially overloaded. Also depending on our mental state, we may or may 
not fall unconscious when we experience dizziness. This is what is implied when Kant says 
that “unconsciousness [or swooning or fainting: Ohnmacht]… usually follows dizziness” 
(Kant, 2006: 59; emphasis in original). The word “usually” implies that we may not faint. 
Even when we do, the many different sensations at issue would be processed under the 
threshold of consciousness, as we will see when examining Kant’s remarks on “dual 
personality.” When we do not fall unconscious, we become sensorially overloaded with the 
senses being unusually heightened while remaining conscious. We would see and 
experience differently. That the Stendhal syndrome typically involves hallucinations further 
suggests that Kant thinks of the syndrome in the two passages. Hallucinations are 
perceptions in the waking state when external stimuli are absent, so that these perceptions 
are taken to be about the external world. When we have such perceptions in sleep, we are 
dreaming. When we have hallucinations, something like what is occurring in dreaming is 
happening in the waking state. That is precisely what is occurring in the experience at issue: 
we are “quite uncertain whether the perception takes place when we are awake or 
dreaming.” This experience would be akin to that of the Stendhal syndrome. 
What is implied by Kant’s reference to “a newcomer in the world” in the second passage? 
Kant thinks that in the experience at issue we experience like a “newcomer in the world” 
does. As noted, by “newcomer in the world” Kant means an infant or a person whose mode 
of experience resembles that of an infant. What Kant is suggesting is this. In infants 
                                                 
9 The syndrome is named after Stendhal’s experience by psychiatrist Graziella Magherini in her La 
Sindrome di Stendhal (Ponte alle Grazie Publishers, Florence, 1989). Magherini’s book and Stendhal’s 
experience are cited in Malkin (1999: 24-25). 
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sensations of their own state are undifferentiated from perceptions of the world, that is, the 
former are fused with the latter in infants (Stern, 2000). For Kant “sensation” is a 
“perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state” (Kant, 1998: A320/B376; 
2006: 45). In the experience at issue, which is that of adults, it becomes difficult to 
differentiate perceptions of the world from modifications of one’s state. External perceptions 
become fused with internal sensations. This occurs in adults when perceptions of the world 
are excessively intensified and overwhelming, because here “external representations 
[perceptions of the world] are changed into internal ones [sensations]” (Kant, 2006: 48). 
There are two cases in which external perceptions become excessively intensified and 
overwhelming. The first case is that in which they literally become so while our senses 
remain normal (e.g. when a sound becomes too loud). The second case is that in which our 
senses become so unusually heightened that otherwise unconscious external perceptions 
become conscious and otherwise normal external perceptions become intensified. Kant 
thinks of the second case in the two passages. In the experience at issue, as our senses 
become unusually heightened, hitherto hidden aspects of the world are revealed in an 
overwhelming flow of perceptions of constantly changing light, color, sound, smell, etc. 
These perceptions modify our state and generate sensations. These perceptions are fused 
with these sensations thereby generated. We become sensorially overloaded. We would feel 
an unusual, much faster and larger influx of sensations-fused-with-perceptions than in 
normal cases where sensations are differentiated from perceptions. We would feel dizziness. 
This is what is implied by Kant’s reference to a “newcomer in the world.” We will draw its 
further implications when we discuss synesthesia. 
Our senses can be coordinated differently so that they operate differently. For instance, 
those who innately lack a sense (e.g. sight) compensate this lack with the use of another 
sense or other senses (e.g. hearing, touch, and olfaction) through exercising the “productive 
power of imagination to a high degree” (Kant, 2006: 65-6). Certainly, those people would not 
come to have the same sensation as that for which they lack a sense. The senses of those 
people, however, become coordinated with one another differently, so that those people 
lead a life smoothly as much as those with the five senses do. With the help of the power of 
imagination (recall Kant’s reference to its neural basis in the brain), the sense faculties can 
work more flexibly and coordinate themselves differently than they normally do. Another 
example showing this is the phenomenon of synesthesia, which we will discuss shortly. Yet 
another example would be the experiment in which subjects, after wearing eyeglasses that 
invert their vision for a certain amount of time, see things flip back to the right way even 
with those eyeglasses on. Kant would have referred to this experiment if it had been 
conducted in his lifetime (it was first carried out by George M. Stratton in the 1890s). 
Kant suggests that our conceptual power can operate differently. The issue of reflection 
(Überlegung or Reflexion) enters here. As noted, Kant argues that the affect of astonishment 
“makes reflection [Überlegung] impossible” and “already contains reflection [Überlegung] in 
itself.” There are two types of reflection. Kant says that “to reflect…[überlegen] is to hold 
given representations up to, and compare them with, either other representations or one’s 
cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible” 
(Kant, 1987: 400; translation for Vorstellungen modified from “presentations” to 
“representations”). Holding given representations up to and comparing them with other 
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representations is called logical reflection, and holding given representations up to and 
comparing them with one’s cognitive power, transcendental reflection (Kant, 1988: 100; 
1998: A260-3/B316-9).10 That affect makes reflection impossible means that reflection, logical 
and transcendental, is prevented from operating in its normal fashion. That astonishment 
contains reflection in itself means that reflection, logical and transcendental, functions 
differently with “unexpected” representations. 
Logical reflection has to do with the formation of concepts. By logical reflection Kant means 
“the going back over different presentations, how they can be comprehended in one 
consciousness” (Kant, 1988: 100; also 1998: A262/B318). Here the normal functioning of our 
cognitive faculties is presupposed. Kant offers an example of the concept of tree. Strictly, 
objects called trees are each unique and unequal in every respect. Somehow, however, 
presentations of these objects are compared with one another, their relevant and irrelevant 
aspects are sorted out, the latter aspects are left aside, and the former aspects are associated 
and equated with one another to generate the concept of tree. In the experience at issue, our 
normal conceptual and concept-generating power is suspended, but new concepts would be 
ready to be generated out of “unexpected” representations. Logical reflection would operate 
differently. 
Logical reflection requires transcendental reflection. Transcendental reflection refers to an 
act of the mind that determines both “the relation of given representations to one or the 
other kind of cognition [to sensibility and, if so, which sense, or to understanding]” and 
“their relation among themselves” (Kant, 1998: A261-2/B317-8). In the experience at issue 
transcendental reflection is prevented from operating in its normal fashion and is at work 
with “unexpected” representations toward a different exercise of our faculties. For 
example, transcendental reflection would operate differently than in the normal way 
when the sensations in dizziness are fused into one sensation dissimilar to a sensation 
arising from any one of the five senses or when external perceptions become fused with 
internal sensations. Transcendental reflection coordinates the relations among 
“unexpected” representations as well as the relations among these representations and 
our faculties.  
Again we can see why Kant considers the experience at issue both to be appreciated and to 
be characterized in the language of mental illness. It is not that we choose at will to execute 
or not to execute transcendental reflection in which way. As Henrich says, transcendental 
reflection always occurs unconsciously “without any effort on our part,” constituting a 
“precondition of rationality” (Henrich, 1989: 42). Somehow, it usually takes place in the way 
it normally does, so that it gives us, as Pillow says, a “self-feeling” for the “proper 
functioning of our cognitive powers” (Pillow, 2000: 23; emphasis in original; see also 
Lyotard, 1994: 11). There is, however, no guarantee that transcendental reflection always 
operates in its normal fashion. It may involuntarily work differently. When it does, we 
would have a “self-feeling” for a functioning of our faculties that is not “proper.” We may 
feel and appreciate such a not-proper exercise simply as a different functioning of our 
faculties. We may feel it as a deviant or abnormal operation threatening a “precondition of 
rationality.” In the latter case our “self-feeling” would be close to that of mental illness. 
                                                 
10 Kant uses the words Überlegung and Reflexion interchangeably (e.g., Kant, 2006: 7, 138, 141). 
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Language loses its normal power to express in the experience at issue. Kant’s reference to 
“eloquent” astonishment and our discussion on reflection indicate his idea that some new 
potentially creative use and form of language may emerge instead as we are sensorially 
overloaded and our faculties thereby operate differently. As Fenves says in stressing the 
implications of the first passage, “all language has been lost, yet something of language, or 
another language,” a “language unlike all others” survives or arises. “This newly overheard 
language of an outstanding pathos is incommensurable with the language of measurement, 
schematization, counting, cognition, and representational thought in general” (Fenves, 1993: 
7-8). Given Kant’s use of the language of mental illness and his view of artistic activity, it is 
worth emphasizing that his idea just noted is confirmed in psychiatry and art. Patients with 
certain mental illnesses are sensorially overloaded, and have a different relationship to 
language and thus speak and think differently than those without such mental illnesses do 
(Fink, 2007: 17-20). Expressions of patients with certain mental illnesses bear remarkable 
similarities to creative expressions of artists, especially of modernist artists (Sass, 1998). 
Indeed, Kant’s account of artistic activity resembles that of mental illness. Artistic activity 
makes the “usual” present itself as the “startling” and makes us see differently. Likewise, 
Kant sees mental illness, to which he gives the word “derangement [Verrückung],” as “a 
totally different standpoint into which the soul is transferred, so to speak, and from which it 
sees all objects differently” (Kant, 2006: 110). An adult would feel similarly when he/she 
sees and comports himself/herself as a “newcomer in the world.” Present in everyone to 
varying degrees, artistic activity manifests itself in different manners. Equally, Kant argues 
that “unreason [Unvernunft],” which is another name for “derangement” (Kant, 2006: 108-
14), is present in everyone to varying degrees and in different ways (Saji, 2009). Artistic 
activity is a positive form in which our faculties operate differently. Likewise, rephrasing 
“derangement” in the sense above as “positive unreason [positive Unvernunft],” Kant stresses 
that “unreason” is “something positive [die etwas Positives]” (Kant, 2006: 110, 112; emphasis in 
original; cf. Saji, 2009).11 Thus understood, it is no surprise that Kant suggests that the 
experience at issue is illuminated by both artistic activity and mental illness.12 
“Unexpected,” normally unconnected representations may become associated with one 
another, so that our faculties virtually operate differently. Kant argues that there are cases in 
                                                 
11 Maintaining his life-long, intense interest in mental disorder, Kant offers a discussion of mental illness 
not widely off the mark in light of the current standards. See Butts (1984). Cf. Nevid (2007), where 
Nevid argues that Kant’s epistemology in his critical philosophy has significant relevance to the 
contemporary practice of cognitive psychotherapy concerning people with cognitive distortions and 
emotional disorders. 
12 Kant, as noted, argues that those who have undergone the experience at issue are psychologically 
compelled to assume and believe in the existence of a necessary being. Presumably, these people are 
thus compelled because otherwise they would be overwhelmed by such an experience so that they feel 
like they are suffering from mental illness. For example, they may feel as if the world would “sink into 
the abyss of nothingness” (A622/B650). Note that Kant describes them as using normal language to 
assume and believe in the existence of a necessary being. That is, after they have experienced losing the 
expressive power of normal language, they recover and stick to it instead of trying to develop some 
new potentially creative use and form of language. In the part after the first passage Kant describes only 
those who regain and adhere to normal language and, even though he refers to “eloquent” 
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which representations can be understood as effectively belonging to faculties to which they 
normally do not belong. As in dreaming, the key is the power of imagination. The 
“productive power of imagination” can “involuntarily” generate unusual connections 
among concepts, sensations, and affects (Kant, 2006: 66). Kant draws attention to the fact 
that a series of representations of one kind can be involuntarily coupled with “a host of 
representations of an entirely different sort” (67). Representations attached to different 
faculties can be coupled with one another. A case in point would be the phenomenon of 
synesthesia.13 Strictly, perhaps we should say that even in such a coupling a representation 
belongs to an appropriate faculty. Representations attached to different faculties, however, 
are coupled in such a way that a representation belonging to an appropriate faculty is 
involuntarily activated whenever other representations attached to other appropriate 
faculties are at work. This would amount to an experience in which our faculties operate 
differently. It can be said that in such a coupling representations virtually belong to faculties 
to which they are normally not attached. 
In the Anthropology Kant refers to the phenomenon of “derangement of the senses 
[Sinnenverrückung]” (Kant, 2006: 36). Kant thinks of the case in which not this or that sense 
but all the senses together function differently than in the normal way. Kant seems to think 
of something like a derangement of the senses in the two passages. It helps to look at Kant’s 
explanation of derangement concerning the faculty of sense elsewhere. Kant defines 
“derangement [Verrückung]” as a characteristic of a person who, “while being awake and 
without a particularly noticeable degree of a vehement malady,” is “representing certain 
things as clearly sensed of which nevertheless nothing is present” (Kant, 2007: 71; emphasis 
in original). Kant then characterizes a person revealing the feature of derangement as a 
“dreamer in waking” (71). This characterization indicates that Kant thinks of something like 
a derangement of the senses in the two passages. It is also likely that “derangement of the 
senses” is meant to refer to synesthesia because Kant’s definition just noted seems to be a 
plausible description of synesthesia from the perspective of nonsynesthetes. For instance, 
some synesthetes, while “being awake and without a particularly noticeable degree of a 
vehement malady,” perceive sounds, letters, or numbers as inherently and distinctly 
colored, but for nonsynesthetes no color at all is present. We might be prone to regard 
synesthesia as a case of derangement of the senses, but we can also appreciate it as an 
example of a different exercise of the senses. 
Kant’s reference to a “newcomer in the world” indicates that he also thinks of something 
like synesthesia in the two passages. Empirical research shows that “newborn babies 
perceive all their sensory impressions as a single whole” and as a “sensory primordial soup” 
rather than separately (van Campen, 2008: 29). As noted, external perceptions and internal 
sensations are undifferentiated here. Such a “single whole” or a “sensory primordial soup” 
where all kinds of sensations are fused with one another reminds us of what Kant refers to 
as dizziness and derangement of the senses. In this sensory primordial soup babies have 
their “neonatal synesthesia,” that is, “presumably everyone is born with a kind of 
synesthesia” (van Campen, 2008: 30, 160). Hidden in our senses, synesthesia is an ability that 
can be developed even if we are now adult nonsynesthetes, so that the line between 
“synesthetes” and “nonsynesthetes” becomes “blurred” (van Campen, 2008: 165; also 151-
                                                 
13 For synesthesia, see Cytowic (2002) and van Campen (2008). 
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166). Artistic activity is a case in point, as shown by the title of van Campen’s book “The 
Hidden Sense: Synesthesia in Art and Science.” Indeed, discussing Kant’s view on art and 
the sensus communis aestheticus in the Critique of Judgment, van Campen argues that “the sensu 
communis aestheticus” can be understood as a “personal gift to perceive special aesthetic 
qualities in multisensory domains (as in personally colored sound synesthesia)” (van 
Campen, 2008: 154; also 146-9, 151-6). Experiencing in the way described in the two passages 
is similar to experiencing in the way a “newcomer in the world” does, so that a kind of 
synesthesia could be cultivated. 
We have seen that Kant seems to think of the Stendhal syndrome both in his discussion of 
dizziness and in the two passages. In fact, Kant seems to think of the experience of dizziness 
in the two passages. In the section in which he treats dizziness, Kant makes the following 
remarks: “when awake one can suddenly be seized by confusion [Verlegenheit] while 
deliberating what to do in an unforeseen case, an inhibition of the orderly and ordinary use 
of one’s faculty of reflection [Reflexionsvermögens], which brings the play of sense 
representations to a standstill” (Kant, 2006: 59). This “is to be regarded as like a momentary 
sleep that seizes one and that requires a collecting [Sammelns] of one’s sensations” (59; 
emphasis in original). “Sleep” is a process in which “a gathering of power [Sammlung der 
Kräfte] for renewed external sensations” occurs so that on awakening “the human being sees 
himself [/herself] as a newborn in the world [neugeboren in der Welt]” (58). These remarks 
seem to illustrate the experience at issue. Kant speaks of “confusion [Verlegenheit]” that 
seizes one who finds oneself in an “unforeseen case,” just as he refers to “surprise” 
(astonishment) as “confusion [Verlegenheit] at finding oneself in an unexpected situation.” 
One feels as if one is seized by a “momentary sleep” although “awake,” just as one feels as if 
one is dreaming although awake. Kant does not say in the remarks at issue that the power of 
reflection is inhibited in its entire use. What Kant says is that its “orderly and ordinary use” 
is inhibited. What is implied is that its different, extraordinary use is available. That is, the 
faculty of reflection operates in a disorderly way or a differently orderly way. When it does, 
one’s faculties also operate differently including a “collecting” and a “play” of “one’s 
sensations” because it involves the activity of the mind as a whole. The mind’s power is 
“gathered” so that one goes through “renewed” (i.e. revitalized and transformed) sensations 
like a “newborn in the world,” just as the mind’s power is animated so that one experiences 
like a “newcomer in the world.” Kant turns to his discussion of dizziness with these 
parallels and implications.14 I thus suggest that Kant thinks of the experience of dizziness in 
the two passages. 
In the two passages Kant also seems to have in mind the phenomenon of involuntary 
association of representations that occurs in the waking state. Discussing the power of 
imagination in its productive function, Kant states: “this association often extends very far, 
and the power of imagination often goes so fast from the hundredth to the thousandth that 
it seems we have completely skipped over certain intermediate links in the chain of 
representations [Vorstellungen], though we have merely not been aware of them” (Kant, 
                                                 
14 The section in which Kant treats dizziness is entitled “On the inhibition, weakening, and total loss of 
the sense faculties” (Kant, 2006: 58). Note that what is inhibited, weakened, or lost is the normal 
functioning of our sense faculties insofar as we are conscious. This is compatible with cases in which 
our faculties can operate differently, consciously and unconsciously, as we have been discussing and 
will discuss shortly. 
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2006: 69). As noted, Kant thinks that there are unconscious representations. Clearly, Kant 
thinks that the mind has different activities processing different kinds and amounts of 
information in different manners at different tempos, consciously and unconsciously. In this 
context Kant again refers to dreaming. If the association of representations when we are 
awake is too strange to make sense of from our normal perspective, we feel as if we are 
“dreaming” (70). Involuntary, accelerated associative activities of this sort would be taking 
place in the experience at issue. 
Elsewhere Kant argues that representations that do not surface to consciousness are 
processed when we are in deep sleep. Kant gives an example of “actions of some sleep-
walkers” who occasionally show “greater understanding in this state” than they do when 
awake (Kant, 2002: 325). In this case, while in deep sleep we have “representations clearer 
and more extensive than even the clearest of the representations we have when we are 
awake” even though we may not at all remember them upon awakening (325). Kant calls 
this phenomenon a “certain dual personality” because it is as if there is a state of 
consciousness different from our normal state of consciousness. A “dual personality” exists 
in us even if it does not appear as behavior like in the case of sleep-walkers (325). Kant does 
not seem to be widely off the mark. Neurological research suggests that the brain is 
activated differently in dreaming than in waking and that dreaming and waking constitute 
two different states of consciousness (Hobson, 2005). Sensations in dizziness would be 
“clearer and more extensive” than normal ones we have when awake, because the senses are 
unusually heightened in dizziness. This suggests that sensations in dizziness, even if we fall 
unconscious, are processed below the threshold of consciousness. 
Kant likens a process in which new representations and associations among them are 
generated to a process in chemistry in which “an entirely new thing emerges (somewhat like 
a neutral salt in chemistry)” (Kant, 2006: 70). Kant goes on to argue: “the play of forces in 
inanimate as well as in animate nature, in the soul as well as in the body, is based on the 
dissolution and union of the dissimilar. It is true that we arrive at cognition of the play of 
forces through experience of its effect; but we cannot reach the ultimate cause and the 
simple components into which its material can be analyzed” (70). Clearly, Kant thinks that 
the mind is capable of generating new, “unexpected” representations out of dissimilar 
representations although we cannot fully analyze this process. Kant’s argument discussed in 
this and the previous two paragraphs applies to perception because perception is one type 
of representation. That is, Kant thinks that when perceiving the external world we are 
actively and creatively processing information, consciously and unconsciously, rather than 
passively receiving and recording information. Kant’s view is supported by empirical 
research.15 
The mode of experience is modified through a different exercise of our faculties. We have 
seen this in the case of artistic activity along with support in empirical research. Kant argues 
for a general case of this. Different or “unexpected” representations we have when our 
faculties operate differently would generate new sensations. Kant says that “all 
representations [Vorstellungen] in us,” be they “sensible,” “intellectual,” or “unnoticeable 
                                                 
15 See Hoffman (2000) and Goodale & Milner (2005). Visual information is processed in different ways at 
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[i.e. unconscious]” “affect the feeling of life, and none of them can be indifferent insofar as it 
is a modification of the subject” (Kant, 1987: 139; translation modified from “presentations” 
to “representations”). Kant then equates “life” with the “mind” as a whole: “The mind 
[Gemüth] taken by itself is wholly life” (139). Representations in us affect the mind, 
involving modifications of our state. Sensations are thereby generated because for Kant 
“sensation” is a “perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state” (Kant, 
1998: A320/B376; also 2006: 45). Each of the “unexpected” perceptions in us when our 
faculties operate differently would generate a sensation. Sensations thus generated would 
be dissimilar to normal ones we have when our faculties function in the normal way. The 
faculty of reflection would operate with these different sensations, organize them, and 
coordinate relations among them and our faculties. While some of such modifications of our 
state may feel like mental illness, some others may feel like modifications different from 
normal ones. The mind would be affected differently by these different sensations and be 
more vitalized than when our faculties operate in their normal fashion. As Kant says in a 
manner reminiscent of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, “perceptions” can also “hinder,” 
“stimulate,” “enlarge,” and make “agile” the “faculty of memory” in an extraordinary way. 
The power of memory, while hindered from operating in its normal fashion, can be 
unusually heightened by certain perceptions. The power of memory would be affected in 
this way by “unexpected” perceptions of the sort we have examined. The faculty of memory 
thus affected would better retain these perceptions than normally, change the sense of past 
experience, and alter the background against which and the way in which we anticipate 
future experience. The mode of experience would be modified through the process 
described above. 
Kant’s reference to dreaming indicates that the mode of experience would be modified 
favorably rather than unfavorably. Just as we cannot dream for too long, we cannot stay too 
long, let alone throughout our life, in the condition in which our faculties operate 
differently. It is not that we at once abandon a mode of experience in which our faculties 
function in the normal way to adopt an entirely new mode of experience in which they 
always operate differently. It is that, just as we wake up from a dream, we come back to a 
normal mode of experience after we have undergone a different exercise of our faculties. 
Still, our then normal mode of experience would be favorably modified by a different 
exercise of our faculties. According to Kant, dreaming advantageously affects our activity in 
the waking state. Indeed, Kant’s point when he says the “powers of the soul” are animated 
while we are dreaming is that these powers are thus vitalized so that they can operate in a 
more active way when we are awake than otherwise. Kant’s point finds empirical support in 
contemporary research. Drawing on Llinas (2002), Hobson says of the “sense of self” and the 
“sense of moving in dream space”: “we dream, perforce to reactivate the brain basis of self-
hood that is embedded in our built-in capacity to generate movement. Put another way, our 
dreams—so constantly and elaborately animated—remind us that we were born with an 
already huge talent for movement and for the sensorimotor perceptions of movement that 
become the center of our sense of self as agents” (Hobson, 2005: 65-6).16 Moreover, in his 
1786 piece “On the philosopher’s medicine of the body,” Kant says that the affect of 
                                                 
16 Hobson discusses other aspects in which dreaming affects us in the waking state (Hobson, 2005: 77-9, 
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“astonishment” is conducive to the health of body and mind (Kant, 2007: 184). The mode of 
experience would be favorably modified by a different exercise of our faculties. Our 
modified mode of experience would become our normal mode of experience, which would 
in turn be favorably modified through a yet different exercise of our faculties. And so on. 
2.5 Supersensible, abyss, and wisdom 
We spend a few words on Kant’s usage of the terms “supersensible,” “abyss,” and 
“wisdom” in the second passage. In the Critique of Judgment Kant speaks of the 
“supersensible” to make sense of the situation in which our faculties are in accord internally 
with one another such that they are in accord externally with nature. The supersensible in 
the second passage differs from that in the third Critique. Unlike in the third Critique, in the 
second passage our faculties operate differently than in the normal way. In the third Critique 
Kant says that the antinomy of taste requires us to postulate the “supersensible” in order to 
find the “unifying point [Vereinigungspunkt] of all our faculties” in it (Kant, 1987: 214; 
translation modified). The two passages have nothing to do with the antinomy of taste. 
Unlike in the third Critique, whether there is an accord or a discord among our faculties is 
not at issue in the two passages. As indicated by the two ways in which Kant characterizes a 
different exercise of our faculties, what may look like a discord may well form a different 
internal accord. Above all, that we lose our “speech” and feel “speechless” astonishment in 
the experience at issue indicates that this is an experience inexpressible in our standard 
vocabulary including the words supersensible, abyss, and wisdom. Still, Kant tries to 
describe such an experience using these words. 
My interpretation of Kant’s use of these words is this. In her discussion of the supersensible 
in the Critique of Judgment Hughes argues that “the supersensible is… the activity of the 
mind understood in its fullest extent as incorporating a range of cognitive powers” (Hughes, 
2010: 141). What is under consideration in the third Critique is the fullest exercise of our 
faculties in their normal functioning. In the experience at issue our faculties are more 
heightened and vitalized than when they operate in the normal way. In that sense, the mind 
can be said to exercise its powers beyond the limits of its normal functioning. Kant, I 
suggest, uses analogously the term supersensible in the second passage to refer to “the 
activity of the mind understood in its fullest extent” beyond the confines of its normal 
operation. I suggest two things about the expression “seeing the abyss of the supersensible 
opening before one’s feet.” First, the word abyss figuratively represents a wide range of 
different ways in which our faculties can operate to the fullest extent. Strictly, the abyss is 
within us because the supersensible has to do with the activity of the mind. Kant’s phrase 
“opening before one’s feet,” however, indicates that we feel as if the abyss belongs to the 
world. Presumably this is because the world involuntarily affects us differently and forces 
our faculties to operate differently rather than we employ our faculties differently at will. 
Second, it is indicated that the experience at issue could feel like something is going wrong 
mentally. If one were “seeing” an “abyss” “opening before one’s feet” even though in fact 
there is no such abyss, this would feel like a hallucination (this is one aspect in which we 
feel as if we are dreaming while awake). In the second passage Kant speaks of “wisdom 
[Weisheit]” that we “did not expect.” Kant refers to “wisdom [Weisheit]” elsewhere in the 
Anthropology, where he defines it as “the idea of a practical use of reason that conforms 
perfectly with the [moral] law” (Kant, 2006: 94). This wisdom differs from that in the second 
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passage because, while the latter is what we “did not expect,” the former is a concept of 
reason that (according to Kant) we know inheres in reason. I suggest that the phrase 
“wisdom” that we “did not expect” is meant to characterize the fact that a different exercise 
of our faculties somehow fits the world so that we experience the world differently and 
appreciate such an experience. That is, it is as if the world is arranged in a way we “did not 
expect” such that it embraces a different exercise of our faculties and a different mode of 
experience thereby generated. 
3. Conclusion 
Kant not only recognizes the possibility of a different operation of our faculties, as occurs in 
some forms of mental disorder. He also explicitly acknowledges the productive value of 
abnormal experience: we can experience the world not merely differently than we do when 
our faculties are operating in their normal fashion, but in some ways better or as well. As 
our faculties function differently, our senses are unusually heightened, aspects of the world 
hidden from us when our faculties operate in the normal way are revealed, and we 
experience in a new, richer way. We can appreciate and enjoy such an experience while we 
may also be overwhelmed by it. Once we have experienced in a new richer way, our mode 
of experience would be favorably modified. In this process we may notice, activate, and 
cultivate some creative potential that would otherwise have remained latent, as suggested 
by Kant’s remarks on artistic activity. The range of what we can make of ourselves may be 
expanded through a different exercise of our faculties. All this finds support in 
contemporary empirical research. The moral to be drawn from our reading of Kant for our 
self-understanding is that we are capable of more, the range of what we can make of 
ourselves is wider, and there is more to sense, perceive, and think in the world, than the 
normal functioning of our faculties leads us to believe. 
I conclude by suggesting the implications of my argument for Kant scholarship as well as 
for research in anthropology. There are two implications for each. For Kant scholarship, 
first, as noted, Kant’s idea spelled out here has been unexamined. My interpretation 
enriches Kant scholarship by bringing out this under-researched dimension of Kant’s 
thought. Second, a topic for future research is suggested. Even within the limits of critical 
philosophy where the normal functioning of the sense faculties is presupposed, their 
autonomy and activity are expanded in the course of critical philosophy from the Critique of 
Pure Reason through the Critique of Judgment (Kukla, 2006). My analysis shows that the sense 
faculties are granted further autonomy and activity in Kant’s anthropological writing 
beyond the confines of critical philosophy. Then, the relation between Kant’s anthropology 
and critical philosophy would need to be reconsidered in terms of the role of sensibility.17 
This is a topic for future research. For research in anthropology, first, it is suggested that 
anthropology can benefit from addressing not only what we are (i.e. how and how much we 
are and were the same or different, physically, culturally, socially, historically, linguistically, 
etc.) but also what we can make of ourselves. My discussion contributes to anthropology by 
offering one way of exploring what we can make of ourselves.18 Second, that Kant’s idea 
                                                 
17 Cf. Foucault (2008), where Foucault argues that Kant’s anthropology serves to interrogate, reinterpret, 
and revise his critical philosophy. 
18 For other implications of Kant’s philosophical anthropology for contemporary anthropology, see 
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explicated here finds empirical support in contemporary research indicates that by 
considering the results of such research anthropologists may develop their own research in 
an interdisciplinary manner. Given these two implications, an intriguing topic that my 
argument suggests for research in anthropology is one on the connection among mental 
illness, artistic activity, and creative potential.19 
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